IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs August 20, 2008

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARCUS GREER

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marshall County
No. 17514 Robert Crigler, Judge

No. M2007-02886-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 29, 2008

Defendant-Appellant, Marcus Greer (hereinafter "Greer"), was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Greer to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, Greer argues the following: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to redact or suppress his statements; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., and JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., joined.

Hershell D. Koger, Pulaski, Tennessee, for the appellant, Marcus Greer.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney General; Charles Crawford, District Attorney General; Weakley E. Barnard, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts. On April 28, 2006, police officers with the 17th Judicial District Drug Task Force were en route to serve Greer with an arrest warrant, unrelated to this case, when they observed him sell drugs to another individual. Greer was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. He provided officers with an oral statement of admission detailing the extent of his drug activity. He was subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, both Class B felonies, and the charges in the instant case.

Pretrial motion hearing. In response to the discovery request, the State provided Greer with a typed summary of the statement he gave to the police. The entire statement follows:

> On April 28, 2006, Greer told Officers "the stuff" under the seat belonged to him (he said this twice). Greer also admitted he had a bag of marijuana in a drawer in the kitchen of Bishop's residence. Greer stated he moved to Lewisburg from Nashville approximately one year before he said he began selling crack cocaine shortly after arriving in Lewisburg. He stated in the beginning he purchased small amounts of crack cocaine from whomever he could get it from [sic]. He said about six months later he hooked up with Cody Reynolds and Reynolds became his main source of supply. He stated he normally purchased two (2) quarter (1/4) [ounces] of crack and powder (cocaine) a week from Reynolds. He said Reynolds would charge him $250.00 for each quarter [ounce]. He said he also purchased from dealers in the Nashville projects. Greer said he had recently learned to convert (cook) powder to crack. He said he had cooked what they had just caught him with [sic]. When asked about the night the Officers had caught Bishop & Eric Greer delivering to William Goodman at Summit Hills, Greer admitted Goodman had called him and ordered the crack cocaine and he sent Bishop and Eric Greer to [deliver] the crack cocaine. When asked about the white female driving the blue car, Greer admitted she had given him $ 15.00 to purchase crack cocaine. Greer told Officers he had a customer base of around fifteen different persons he sold crack cocaine to in Lewisburg.

At the pre-trial hearing on several of Greer's motions, including his motions to redact or suppress the aforementioned statement, Assistant Director Tim Miller of the 17th Judicial District Drug Task Force testified that he knew Greer prior to his arrest in the instant case. He also knew that Greer lived with his girlfriend, Ebony Bishop, and that she drove a maroon Thunderbird. On the day of his arrest, Miller and two detectives drove in unmarked vehicles to Bishop's home to serve an existing warrant on Greer. Although no cars were in the driveway, Bishop's maroon Thunderbird pulled up shortly after the officers' arrival. Miller recognized Bishop as the driver and Greer as the front seat passenger. Miller further observed a white female from another vehicle briefly make contact with the person in the maroon Thunderbird. Bishop began to pull away but stopped when Miller drove directly toward her vehicle and initiated his emergency blue lights.

Immediately thereafter, Miller exited his vehicle along with two other detectives. As Miller approached Bishop's vehicle, he saw "Greer leaning down and stuffing something under the side of the seat, between the door and the side of the seat, the door frame." Miller opened the passenger door, told Greer to show his hands, and advised him that he had a warrant for his arrest. As Greer complied, Miller saw the top of a plastic "sandwich" size bag containing a substance that appeared

to be crack cocaine in plain view between the passenger seat and the door frame. As he stepped out of the car, Greer twice stated, "That stuff is mine." Miller said that Greer told him that "it didn't have anything to do with Bishop. It was his." Miller retrieved the bag, and the substance in the bag was later confirmed by testing to be 2.2 grams of crack cocaine. Miller also searched Greer's person and found approximately $100 and a set of digital scales.

Miller explained that Greer showed "a great willingness" to sit down and talk with law enforcement at the arrest location. However, Miller advised Greer to "[w]ait until [they got] to the jail [to talk to me]. " After they arrived at the jail, Greer was advised of his Miranda rights in the presence of another officer.

During his testimony at the pre-trial hearing, Miller read the majority of Greer's statement to the trial court without objection. Miller's testimony at this hearing centered primarily on the distinction between a crack cocaine user and a crack cocaine dealer. During cross-examination, defense counsel, at length, challenged Miller's ability to testify as an expert "on whether [the recovered drugs were] a usage amount or [a] resale purpose amount." Ultimately, Miller stated that the amount of drugs and money, as well as the digital scales, recovered from Greer indicated he was a crack cocaine dealer. Greer did not offer any proof at this hearing.

The trial court denied Greer's motion in part and ruled that the following statements were admissible at trial:

(A) On April 28, 2006, Greer told Officers "the stuff" under the seat belonged to him (he said this twice).

(B) Greer stated that he moved to Lewisburg from Nashville approximately one year before he said he began selling crack cocaine after arriving in Lewisburg.

(C) Greer said he had recently learned to convert (cook) powder to crack. He said he had cooked what they had just caught him with.

(D) When asked about the white female driving the blue car, Greer admitted she had given him $15.00 to purchase crack cocaine.

(E) Greer told officers he had a customer base of around fifteen different persons he sold crack cocaine to in Lewisburg.

Trial. The proof at trial consisted largely of the same proof presented at the pre-trial hearing except for the testimony of Director Tim Lane of the 17th Judicial District Drug Task Force, and Agent John Scott, Jr., a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. Miller essentially repeated his testimony from the pre-trial hearing and testified Greer claimed ownership of the seized cocaine by twice stating, "[T]hat stuff is mine." Greer made it clear that the drugs belonged to him and not his girlfriend. Miller seized between $100 and $200 from Greer's person

and opined that the substance on the recovered digital scales was cocaine residue. No drugs were recovered from the white female in the blue vehicle. Statements (A), (C), (D), and (E), above were admitted into evidence at trial. In addition, the State voluntarily redacted the "one year" language in Statement (B), and Miller testified to the remainder of Statement (B), stating that "[Greer] began selling crack cocaine shortly after arriving in Lewisburg." Director Lane, a thirteen-year veteran with the Drug Task Force, testified as the evidence custodian for the Drug Task Force, who "maintain[ed] care, custody, and control [of the seized drugs] . . . until [he] took [the drugs] to the TBI crime laboratory." Agent Scott testified that he received the substance from the Drug Task Force, tested it, and determined that it was 2.2 grams of cocaine base.

Greer did not present any evidence at trial, and he was convicted by the jury as charged. After Greer waived his sentencing hearing, the trial court merged both counts and sentenced Greer as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Greer subsequently filed this timely appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Motions to Suppress. Greer does not object to the admissibility of statement (A). However, Greer does argue that the trial court improperly denied his motions to suppress the aforementioned statements (B), (C), (D), and (E) because they are not relevant, they constitute inadmissable prior bad acts, and they include improper character evidence. He asserts that the trial court "never addressed the prejudicial effect inherent in allowing [the statements]," and demands a new trial based on the trial court's failure to substantially comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 404(b). In response, the State argues the trial court properly admitted Greer's statements, as redacted, and contends, even if the statements are prior bad acts, they are admissible to prove Greer's intent. We agree with the State.

A trial court's factual findings regarding a motion to suppress are presumed correct on appeal unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them. State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). The prevailing party is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 247 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). The credibility of the witness, the weight and value of the evidence, and the resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters decided by the trial court. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. The appellant has the burden of showing that the evidence preponderates against the determination of the trial court. State v. West, 767 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tenn. 1989). This court's review of the application of the law to the facts, however, is de novo. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000).

This court reviews a trial judge's determination of relevant evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Tenn. R. Evid. 401. If the evidence is determined relevant by the trial judge, it is admissible, so long as it does not contravene "the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Tennessee, [the Tennessee

Rules of Evidence, or other rules or laws of general application in the courts of Tennessee." Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence, however, "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Tenn. R. Evid. 403.

Generally, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait." Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Nonetheless, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for other purposes, such as to show motive, intent, guilty knowledge, identity of the defendant, absence of mistake, existence of a common scheme or plan, or completion of the evidence. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 582 (Tenn. 2004); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b), Advisory Comm'n Cmts. The Tennessee Supreme Court has suggested that trial courts take a "'restrictive approach of [Rule] 404(b) . . . because "other act" evidence carries a significant potential for unfairly influencing a jury.'" State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 387 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (omission in original) (quoting Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard, Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 404.7 at 131)).

In order to admit evidence of prior bad acts, the trial court must comply with the following procedure:

> (1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury's presence;
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> (2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other than conduct conforming with a character trait and must upon request state on the record the material issue, the ruling, and the reasons for admitting the evidence;
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> (3) The court must find proof of the other crime, wrong, or act to be clear and convincing; and
>
> (4) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). The fact that prior bad acts evidence is contained within a defendant's properly Mirandized statement to police concerning the offense does not relieve the trial court of the duty to conduct a Rule 404(b) hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence. See State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 239 (Tenn. 2005). If the trial court substantially complies with the requirements of Rule 404(b), the trial court's admission of the challenged evidence shall not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d at 652. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court "applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining." State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999) (citations omitted). Where the trial court fails to substantially comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 404(b), its decision is not entitled to deference by this

court, and "the determination of admissibility will be made by the reviewing court on the evidence presented at the jury out hearing." DuBose, 953 S.W.2d at 652-653.

As an initial matter, Greer alleges that the statements at issue are improper character evidence under Rule 404(a). However, he has failed to present any argument in support of this issue in his brief. "Issues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this court." Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); State v. Thompson, 36 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Consequently, we will not consider this issue because it has been waived.

Even though Greer states in his brief that "the trial court did not substantially comply with Rule 404(b)," he does not challenge the procedures used by the trial court to admit his statements. Further, the record shows the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing without objection by Greer. Thus, our review is for an abuse of discretion.

In this case, the trial court analyzed each sentence within Greer's statement. During the pre-trial hearing, the court explained:

> The next difficult [statement] is, "Greer stated he moved to Lewisburg from Nashville approximately one year before, he said he beg[a]n selling crack cocaine shortly after arriving in Lewisburg." My inclination is that the State could use that. I know, [defense counsel], you are going to take issue with that . . . .
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> . . . .
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> Then we go on -- I do think the State -- the next statement going down tends to touch on the case itself. "Greer said he had recently learned to convert (cook) powder crack. He said he had cooked what they had just caught him with." I think the State should be allowed to introduce that. . . . I do think the State should be permitted to say, "When asked about the white female driving the blue car, Greer admitted she had given him $15 to purchase crack cocaine." That's dealing with the same drug in issue, and it appears the issue is going to be simple possession versus possession with intent. That goes to the heart of that issue. It seems to be highly probative of that. Obviously, it is prejudicial. Proof of guilt is always prejudicial. It doesn't mean it is unfairly prejudicial. Then the next problematic statement is, "Greer told the officers he had a customer base of around 15 different persons he sold crack cocaine to in Lewisburg." I think I would permit that as well. That is -- I have already intimated

> that the statement that he began selling crack shortly after arriving in Lewisburg would be admissible. That seems to go hand in hand with that.

After going through the statements at the pre-trial hearing, the trial court told defense counsel that it would consider, but would not promise to actually give, an explanatory jury instruction regarding evidence of other crimes, if such an instruction were presented by defense counsel. The trial court then explained:

> There is a [pattern jury] instruction, 4210. . . . It says, "If from the proof, you find the defendant has committed a crime or crimes other than that for which he is on trial, you may not consider such evidence to prove his or her disposition to commit such a crime as that on trial." That is not exactly true in this case because the logic of the Court in allowing [the statements] does go to [Greer's] disposition. It goes to his intent, what his possession was, what his intent or alleged possession was. . . . The [pattern jury] instruction goes on to say, "This evidence may only be considered by you for the limited purpose of determining whether it proves (a) the complete story of the crime; that is, such evidence may be considered by you where the prior crime or crimes [and] the present alleged crime are logically related or connected or are part of the same transaction so that the proof of the other tends or is necessary to prove the one charged or is necessary for a complete account thereof." I think part of that does apply. I think that if he is a seller, that is logically related or connected to proving his mens rea at the time of his possession of the drugs in question in this case. . . . [Subsection] (b) [discusses] identity. I don't think that applies. [Subsection] (c) says, "A scheme or plan; that is, such evidence may be considered by you if it tends to establish that the defendant engaged in a common scheme or plan for the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other." Sort of dances around it, but not exactly on point. Then [subsection] (d) says, "Motive; that is, such evidence may be considered by you if it tends to show a motive of the defendant for the commission of the offense presently charged." I'm not so sure about that, and then intent may be the most salient one of all. [Subsection (e) states,]"The defendant's intent; that is, such evidence may be considered by you if it tends to establish the defendant actually intended to commit the crime for which he is presently charged" and then (f) is similar,

> "Guilty knowledge." [Subsection] (f) says, "Guilty knowledge; that is, such evidence may be considered by you where guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged, and evidence of the other offenses tends to establish that the defendant possessed this knowledge at the time of the commission of the crime presently charged," and then the instruction . . . goes on to say, "Such evidence of other crimes, if considered by you for any purpose, must not be considered for any purpose other than that specifically stated." That is a mouthful for you all, but I never said this was easy.
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> [Defense Counsel], I am just going to suggest that if you have a proposed . . . explanatory instruction along those lines, I would consider it. The State may want to look at that 4210, too, because you may object to his proposal. You may want to have your own . . . .

At the pre-trial hearing, the trial court ultimately concluded, "the probative value of what I have laid out [regarding Greer's statements] outweighs the prejudicial effect [of his statements]." During trial, defense counsel decided not to have the jury instructed on the aforementioned pattern instruction 42.10. Defense counsel also declined to offer an instruction of his own regarding prior bad acts.

In order to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these statements, we will review each of Greer's statements individually. Because Greer does not contest the admissibility of statement (A), it will not be discussed.

Statement (B) states, "Greer stated that he moved to Lewisburg from Nashville approximately one year before he said he began selling crack cocaine after arriving in Lewisburg." At the pre-trial hearing, defense counsel argued that this statement was "just a big long sentence [that] sounds like a year of prior bad acts of selling cocaine, and [it] should not be allowed." At trial, however, the State redacted Statement (B) and Miller only testified that, "[Greer] said he began selling crack cocaine shortly after arriving in Lewisburg." By redacting the one-year time frame, the State eliminated Greer's concern that the jury would interpret it to mean that he sold cocaine for an entire year.

Additionally, under Rule 404(b), statement (B) is especially probative of Greer's intent to sell crack cocaine because his principal argument at trial was that he only used drugs. We agree with the trial court that this statement is relevant to the material issue of Greer's mental state at the time of his possession of the cocaine, which is a non-character conforming purpose, the probative value

of which outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by the admission of statement (B).

Statement (C) states, "Greer said he had recently learned to convert (cook) powder to crack. He said he had cooked what they had just caught him with." Here, Greer's statement corroborates the physical evidence, the crack cocaine, that was actually seized in this case. He described the seized evidence and explained to law enforcement how the substance was made. Greer demonstrated his intimate knowledge of the seized substance and excluded the possibility that someone else may have been responsible for it. This statement is relevant because it directly refers to an element of the charged offense. Greer does not state how this statement constitutes a prior bad act or in what way he was unfairly prejudiced by its admission. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by the admission of statement (C).

Statement (D) states, "When asked about the white female driving the blue car, Greer admitted she had given him $15 to purchase crack cocaine." At trial, Miller testified that immediately prior to stopping Greer, he observed another blue car, driven by a white female, pull up and make contact with Greer's vehicle. Miller stated, "[i]t was obvious to me as I circled around and came into view, that I was seeing, at that point . . . ." Defense counsel then objected based on speculation, which was sustained by the trial court. Miller was permitted to testify only as to his observations and later interaction with the white female driving the blue car. Greer's statement (D) corroborates isolated facts, as described by Miller, which serve as the basis of the instant indictment. It is also relevant to prove the elements of the charged offenses. Further, as noted by the trial court, the statement is relevant to "simple possession versus possession with intent [to sell and deliver the drugs]." Greer's brief does not state why he believes this statement is irrelevant, how it constitutes a prior bad act, or why he was unfairly prejudiced by its admission. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by the admission of statement (D).

Statement (E) states, "Greer told officers he had a customer base of around fifteen different persons he sold crack cocaine to in Lewisburg." Statement (E) presents a closer question. It does not include the dates that Greer sold drugs to "fifteen different persons" or the amount of drugs that he sold to them. Statement (E) obviously speaks to Greer's customer base and corroborates Greer's status as a drug dealer. However, unlike the previous statements, statement (E) does include other bad acts that were committed by Greer outside the scope of the indictment. Therefore, we cannot agree with the trial court's finding that statement (E) does not involve prior bad acts. Nevertheless, the trial court properly determined that statement (E) was more probative of Greer's intent to sell the drugs, a non-character conforming purpose, which outweighed any unfair prejudice to him. This court has consistently held that evidence of prior drug sales is probative of the defendant's intent to possess drugs for resale. State v. Little, 854 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); see also State v. Richard Wayne Hampton, No. W2006-02189-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 169645, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 18, 2008). Accordingly, even if the trial court's admission of statement (E) was error, we conclude that it was harmless.

II. **Sufficiency of the Evidence**. Greer also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Greer specifically argues "there was no evidence at trial that [he] possessed the cocaine for the purposes of sale or delivery." In response, the State argues the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. We agree.

When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, we must consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (2006) ("Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."). This standard applies to convictions based upon direct, circumstantial, or a combination of both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citation omitted). The State, on appeal, is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all legitimate or reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact, and this court will not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 689-690 (Tenn. 2005). This court has often stated that "[a] guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the prosecution's theory." Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659 (citation omitted). A guilty verdict also "removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, and the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict." Id. (citation omitted).

In order to obtain a conviction in this case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Greer knowingly possessed a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4) (2006). If the amount involved is .5 grams or more of any substance containing cocaine, it is a Class B felony. T.C.A. § 39-17-417(c) (2006).

Greer's argument is twofold: (1) he did not have the requisite intent to sell or deliver the drugs; and (2) the absence of drugs on the white female in the blue vehicle corroborates his claim. Here, Miller testified that he observed a white female from another blue vehicle briefly make contact with Greer's vehicle. Miller then stated, "As he approach[ed Greer's] vehicle, [he saw] Greer leaning down and stuffing something under the side of the seat, between the door and the side of the seat, the door frame. . ." Once Miller observed the plastic bag containing crack cocaine, Greer twice stated, "That stuff is mine." Greer made it clear that the drugs belonged to him and not his girlfriend. After seizing the drugs, Miller also searched Greer's person and found between $100 and $200 and a set of digital scales. Although no drugs were seized from the white female in the blue car, Greer confirmed that Miller observed him sell drugs to her right before his arrest. In light of the amount of money, the digital scales, and the weight and packaging of the seized drugs, it was not paramount

to the successful prosecution of the case to find drugs on the white female. Additionally, Greer's argument simply ignores his own admission to the sale of drugs. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was more than sufficient to prove that Greer possessed the seized drugs with the intent to sell and deliver. Greer is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Conclusion. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Greer's convictions for felony possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE